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Using a three-gap model, this paper simulates the future time paths of resource 
deficits in Pakistan. The paper then show that the policy of increasing the rate of return 
on foreign capital can reduce foreign debt when foreign capital is sufficiently responsive 
to changes in its rate of return. This, however, happens at the expense of increasing 
domestic debt. The policy of selling public assets abroad appears fruitless. The main 
benefit of this policy is a reduction in domestic debt which can better be achieved by 
selling public assets domestically. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan is currently facing severe resource constraints due to growing the 
volume of external and internal debt. Although a sustainable solution to the problem 
lies in raising the national saving rate through the much needed reforms towards 
increasing productivity in the economy, the policy-makers instead have been content 
with various measures for a short term relief. The most commonly adopted approach 
has been to roll-over the existing debt. A few half-hearted attempts have recently 
been made to replace foreign debt with private foreign capital by creating a 
competitive environment that promises better returns on investment, and through the 
sale of public-sector enterprises to potential foreign investors. 
This study explores the effects of two different policies of attracting foreign 
investment on foreign borrowing and debt. One of these policies is to increase the 
rate of return on foreign capital and the other is to sell public-sector enterprises to 
foreign investors. Most of the earlier studies on foreign investment have 
concentrated on its role in economic growth. The general conclusion has been that 
foreign investment does not bring any sustainable benefits unless it favourably 
affects fundamentals of the economy such as the saving rate or the rate of 
technological progress [see, for example, Ahmad and Paul (1994) and Crouch 
(1973)]. 
Our study is not much different from the studies on the role of foreign 
investment in growth models except that the increased foreign investment in the 
present context are assumed to be utilised in reducing foreign borrowing rather than 
increasing the growth rate of GDP. As such it can be expected that a permanent 
solution to the external debt problem does not necessarily lie in attracting foreign 
investment. However, it is still useful to settle the issue in the framework of 
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conventional gap models (rather than the growth model) that are frequently used to 
study the dynamics of foreign debt. The analysis is carried out in the framework of a 
three-gap simulation model that provides sufficient dynamic linkages across the 
current and capital account balances in the private, public and foreign transactions. 
The paper is planned as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of the three-
gap model. In Section 3 the effects of the two policies on the future time paths of 
foreign and domestic borrowing and debt are studied under alternative assumptions. 
Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  THE MODEL 
Following the standard procedure [e.g., Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993) 
and Tanzi et al. (1988)], we use national income accounts to express the primary 
foreign deficit in term of the primary fiscal and private sector’s deficits: 
 
IMi – Xi – Qi = (Gi + Igi – Ti) + (Ci + Ipi + Ti – Yi – Qi) 
                    = (Igi – Sgi) + (Ipi – Spi),  ... ... ... ...  (1) 
 
where IMi , Xi and Qi are imports, exports and net unrequited transfers from abroad in 
period i; Gi and Ci are government and private consumption expenditure; Igi and Ipi are 
government and private investment expenditures; Ti is the tax and non-tax government 
revenue plus the surplus of government enterprises, Yi is the GDP, Sgi = Ti – Gi and Spi 
= Ydi – Ci are the government and private savings and Ydi = Yi + Qi – Ti is the private 
sector’s disposable income. All the variables are measured in local currency at constant 
prices. 
Generalising Naqvi’s (1970) two-gap results, we can show that the time paths of 
primary resource deficits are given by the dynamic equations:
1 
  
Igi – Sgi = (Igi–1 – Sgi–1) + [(λi ki ni+1 – λi–1 ki–1 ni)/ni 
               + λi ki ni+1 – (ti – gi)] ni Yi–1, ...  ...  ...  (2) 
 
Ipi – Spi = (Ipi–1 – Spi–1) + [{(1–λi) ki ni+1 – (1–λi-1) ki–1 ni}/ni 
               + (1–λi) ki ni+1 – si (1 + qi – ti)] ni Yi–1, ...  ... (3) 
 
IMi – Xi – Ri = (IMi–1 – Xi–1 – Ri–1) + [(ki ni+1 – ki–1 ni)/ni + ki ni+1 
                       – {(ti – gi) + si (1 + qi – ti)}] ni Yi–1, ...  ...  (4) 
where λ, k and n are respectively the share of public sector in total investment, the 
incremental capital-output ratio and the growth rate of GDP; t, g and q are the marginal 
rates of tax, government consumption expenditure and unrequited transfers from 
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abroad per rupee of GDP and s is the marginal private saving rate per rupee of 
disposable income. 
Since the primary resource deficits are measured in local currency, the interest 
payments on foreign debt and rental payments on the private foreign capital must also 
be denominated in local currency for the purpose of aggregation. Further, since the 
interest and capital rental payments are made in nominal terms, primary resource 
deficits should also be escalated over time by price inflation. Further assuming that full 
Fisher effects of inflation are operative, the nominal values of the exchange rate 
depreciation factor, the rental factor on private foreign capital, and the interest factor on 
foreign and domestic debt are adjusted one to one with inflation. Thus the time paths of 
the current account and budget deficits, CADi and BDi respectively, are: 
 
CADi = (1+πi)(IMi – Xi – Ri) + rfi(1+ei) FDi–1 + {(1+ρi)(1+πi)–1}(1+ei) FKi–1,  (5) 
BDi = (1+ πi)(Igi – Sgi) + rfi(1+ei) FDi–1 + {(1+rdi)(1+πi)–1} DDi–1, ...  (6) 
 
where rf is the interest rate on foreign debt fixed in nominal foreign currency; ρ is the 
real rate of return on the private foreign capital; rd is the real rate of interest on 
domestic debt; e is the rate of nominal exchange rate depreciation; π is the domestic 
inflation rate; and FDi–1, Fki–1 and DDi–1 are foreign debt, the private foreign capital 
and domestic debt at the end of period i–1 measured in local currency. 
The net foreign borrowing equals the current account deficit minus net private 
capital inflow ∆FK plus the change in foreign reserves ∆FR [see Cohen (1988)]. The 
net domestic borrowing equals the budget deficit minus net foreign borrowing plus 
change in foreign reserves minus monetary borrowing or the change in high powered 
money ∆M. That is, 
 
FBi = CADi – ∆FKi + ∆FRi,  ... ... ... ...  (7) 
DBi = BDi – FBi + ∆FRi – ∆Mi. ... ... ... ...  (8) 
 
Foreign debt in period i equals foreign debt at the end of period i–1, escalated by 
the exchange rate depreciation, plus the net foreign borrowing during period i. 
Likewise domestic debt in period i equals the last period’s domestic debt plus the net 
domestic borrowing during period i. That is, 
 
FDi = (1+ei) FDi–1 + FBi,  ... ... ... ... ...  (9) 
DDi = DDi–1 + DBi,  ... ... ... ... ... (10) 
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The time paths of money supply, foreign reserves and foreign capital can be 
traced using their growth rates and the initial values: 
 
∆Mi = GMi Mi–1,  ... ... ... ... ... ... (11) 
∆FRi = GFRi FRi–1,  ... ... ... ... ... ... (12) 
∆FKi = GFKi FKi–1,  ... ... ... ... ... ... (13) 
 
where GM, GFR and GFK are the growth rates of money supply, foreign reserves and 
foreign capital respectively. It is assumed that the growth rates Gm  and  GFR are 
exogenous; determined by monetary authority. Finally, the growth rate of foreign 
capital GFK is initially also assumed to be exogenously fixed. 
We now discuss the implications of two different policies that can affect the 
growth rate of foreign capital. The first policy to attract capital inflow is to increase the 
real rental on foreign capital ρ. But an increase in ρ also means increased payment of 
factor income abroad. The net effect of increasing ρ depends on sensitivity of the 
growth rate of foreign capital GFK to changes in ρ. This sensitivity is measured by a 
linear response function: 
 
∆GFKi =β ∆ρi, ... ... ... ... ... ... (14) 
 
We can determine the numerical range of β for which the proposed policy can 
favourably effects resource deficits by conducting iterative experiments with the 
model. This exercise will be done in the next section. 
The second policy is to sell public-sector enterprises to foreign investors. The 
effectiveness of this policy depends on the degree of crowding out of the foreign capital 
inflow. Disinvestment through sale of public assets means a decrease in net investment 
in the public sector. This in turn reduces the public sector’s share in investment 
expenditure λ and increases the private sector’s share, including the foreign investment, 
1–λ. The change in the nominal value of the stock of foreign capital in period i δFKi 
following a permanent reduction in λ by ∆λ taking place from period 1 is: 
 
δFKi = (1–γ1) [(1+πi)..(1+π1)Ii + ..... + (1+π1)I1] ∆λ 
         = (1–γ1) [(1+πi)..(1+π1) ki ni+1 Yi + ..... + (1+π1) k1 n2 Y1] ∆λ 
         = (1–γ1) [ki ni+1 (1+πi)(1+ni)..(1+π1)(1+n1) + ..... + k1 n2 (1+π1)(1+n1)]Y0 ∆λ 
 
where γ measures the degree of crowding out. If γ = 1 then the purchase of public 
assets by foreign investors results in an equal reduction in foreign investment in other 
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and 1 represents partial crowding out. Finally, γ < 0 means crowding-in, that is the sale 
of public assets opens door for further investment. For example, once the foreign 
investors establish their business, they may discover it worth while to expand business. 
If γ, π, k, n and GFK are constant over time, the above equation simplifies as 
 
δFKi = (1–γ) k n [(1+π)(1+n)/(πn+π+n)] [(1+ π)
i(1+n)
i – 1] Y0 ∆λ 
 
The growth rate of foreign capital G′FKi = (FKi–FKi–1)/FKi–1 including the effect of a 
permanent reduction in λ taking place in period 1 can be shown to be: 
 
′ =
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3.  ESTIMATION AND SIMULATION 
The parameters of the model, estimated as averages or compound growth rates 
using data for the past five to eight years, are given in Table 1. The data are taken from 
various issues of Annual Report and Economic Survey. 
 
Table 1 
The Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Estimate 
Share of public sector in investment: λi  0.51 
Capital-output ratio: ki 3.80 
Growth rate of GDP: ni    0.047 
Marginal rate of tax: ti 0.17 
Marginal rate of government consumption expenditure: gi 0.12 
Marginal rate of private savings: si 0.15 
Marginal rate of unrequited transfers: qi 0.05 
Nominal rate of interest on foreign debt: rfi    0.036 
Real rate of interest on domestic debt:: rdi 0.01 
Real rate of return on the private foreign capital: ρi  0.05 
Growth rate of the private foreign capital: GFKi 0.18 
Growth rate of foreign reserves: GFRi 0.15 
Growth rate of high powered money: GMii 0.13 
Rate of exchange rate depreciation: ei 0.08 
Inflation rate: πI  0.10 Eatzaz Ahmad  948 
Table 2 shows the results of simulation under the assumption that all the parameters 
retain their historic values. These results show that foreign and domestic borrowing and 
debt would grow exponentially at an annual compound rate between 15 percent and 20 
percent over the next 25 years. These projections are in nominal terms and, hence, they 
include the effect of an assumed 10 percent inflation rate. To factor out the inflationary 
effects, the resource deficits are expressed as ratios to the nominal GDP. The last four 
columns of Table 2 show that these ratios are also expected to grow, though at a much 
lower rate. Foreign borrowing would increase from 2.4 percent of GDP in 1995-96 to 4.1 
percent in 2019-20. Domestic borrowing would increase from 2.7 percent to 6.7 percent 
over the same period. These modest growth rates leave the already large volumes of foreign 
and domestic debt relatively stable. Foreign debt is expected to grow by a little less than 1 
percent per annum while domestic debt would remain almost constant. 
  Domestic debt is expected to grow slower than the foreign debt despite the 
expectation that domestic borrowing would grow faster than the foreign borrowing. This 
is so because while the foreign debt measured in rupees also grows on account of an 
expected 8 percent depreciation of rupee per annum, there is no such indexation in case 
of domestic debt. 
We now study the effects of the two policies to attract foreign capital inflow 
discussed in Section 2. The effects of increasing the rate of return on foreign capital ρ 
depend on β, the degree of responsiveness in the growth rate of foreign capital GFK to 
changes in ρ. Various iterations over β to determine the effects of an increase in ρ by 1 
percent from 5 percent to 6 percent resulted in a critical value: β = 0.8 at which the increase 
in ρ leaves negligible effects on resource deficits, in particular the net foreign borrowing 
and foreign debt. Thus an increase in the rate of return on foreign capital from 5 percent to 
6 percent would have little effect on resource deficits if it results in an increase in the 
growth rate of foreign capital by 0.8 percent from 18 percent to 18.8 percent. 
Now consider the effects of increasing ρ by 1 percent, assuming alternatively that 
the resulting increase in the growth rate of foreign capital is high and low. The simulated 
effects of this policy with β = 1.6 (high response) and β = 0.4 (low response) are 
reported in Table 3 and Table 4 respectively. 
With β = 1.6 the unfavourable effect on foreign resource deficit of the increased 
factor payments abroad is more than offset by the favourable effect of the increased 
capital inflow. As a result net foreign borrowing and foreign debt decrease substantially. 
The reduced foreign borrowing in turn implies that government has to increase domestic 
borrowing for the following reason. Since the government’s budget position does not 
improve as we explain below, any decrease in foreign borrowing must be offset by an 
increase in domestic borrowing. Alternatively, given the GDP growth rate and the share 
of private sector in investment expenditure, the increased foreign investment means an 
equal decrease in investment by the domestic private sector and thus an improvement in 
the private sector’s current balance. The resulting surplus in domestic capital market 
must be borrowed by government to restore equilibrium. Table 2 
Foreign and Domestic Borrowing and Debt 
   Year  FBi DBi  FDi  DDi  FB/Y(%)  DB/Y(%)  FD/Y(%)  DD/Y(%) 
1995-96      51      58      788      842  2.39  2.72  36.68  39.20 
1999-00      87    105    1393    1180  2.30  2.77  36.84  31.20 
2003-04    154    210    2452    1834  2.31  3.15  36.87  27.58 
2007-08    287    444    4355    3201  2.45  3.79  37.22  27.35 
2011-12    565    951    7894    6124  2.75  4.62  38.34  29.75 
2015-16 1182  2023  14777  12364  3.26  5.59  40.80  34.14 
2019-20 2595  4238  28828  25502  4.07  6.65  45.24  40.02 
CGR  17.77  19.55    16.18    15.27  2.25  3.80    0.88    0.09 
 Table 3 
Foreign and Domestic Borrowing and Debt (∆ρ = 0.1, β = 1.6) 
    Year  FBi DBi FDi DDi  FB/Y(%)  DB/Y(%)  FD/Y(%)  DD/Y(%) 
1995-96      49      60      786      844  2.30  2.80  36.60  39.29 
1999-00      82    111    1374    1198  2.17  2.93  36.34  31.70 
2003-04    140    227    2383    1903  2.11  3.42  35.84  28.62 
2007-08    253    490    4152    3404  2.16  4.19  35.49  29.09 
2011-12    486  1065    7357    6664  2.36  5.17  35.74  32.37 
2015-16    997  2295  13434  13715  2.75  6.34  37.09  37.87 
2019-20 2175  4871  25600  28754  3.41  7.64  40.17  45.12 
CGR  17.08  20.09    15.62    15.84  1.66  4.27    0.39    0.58 
 Table 4 
Foreign and Domestic Borrowing and Debt (∆ρ = 0.1, β = 0.4) 
  Year  FBi DBi FDi  DDi  FB/Y(%)  DB/Y(%)  FD/Y(%)  DD/Y(%) 
1995-96      54      56      791      840  2.50  2.60  36.80  39.09 
1999-00      92      98    1415    1158  2.45  2.59  37.42  30.62 
2003-04    165    194    2520    1766  2.48  2.92  37.89  26.55 
2007-08    308    411    4524    3031  2.64  3.51  38.66  25.90 
2011-12    609    882    8275    5741  2.96  4.29  40.20  27.89 
2015-16 1266  1884  15590  11544  3.49  5.20  43.04  31.87 
2019-20 2756  3962  30502  23811  4.32  6.22  47.87  37.37 
CGR  17.82  19.44    16.44    14.95  2.30  3.70    1.10  –0.19 
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With the foreign debt being gradually replaced by the domestic debt, 
government’s budget deficit also increases since the interest rate on domestic debt is 
higher than the interest rate on foreign debt (including the effect of depreciating rupee). 
This puts further pressure to increase domestic borrowing. The results show that the 
increase in net domestic borrowing is slightly more than the decrease in net foreign 
borrowing and, therefore, the overall borrowing need of the government increases. The 
increase in the overall size of public (foreign plus domestic) debt is, however, 
negligible. 
When the growth rate of foreign capital increases by one-half of the increase in 
the rate of return on foreign capital, that is β = 0.4, the results are just the opposite (see 
Table 4). Thus the policy of offering a better returns on foreign investment can only 
replace foreign debt by the domestic debt. And even this happens when the inflow of 
foreign capital is sensitive enough to changes in the rate of return on foreign capital. 
Coming to the second policy of attracting foreign capital, we consider the sale 
of public-sector enterprises that results in a permanent reduction in the government’s 
share in investment expenditure λ by 5 percent from 51 percent to 46 percent under 
four alternative assumptions on the crowding out of exogenous capital inflows: no 
crowding out (γ = 0), full crowding out (γ = 1), 50 percent crowding out (γ = 0.5) and 
50 percent crowding-in (γ = –05). The results are reported in Table 5 to Table 8. 
In the absence of crowding out, the immediate effect of the policy is a 
substantial increase in the growth rate of foreign capital and a corresponding decrease 
in net foreign borrowing and foreign debt (Table 5). These benefits, however, quickly 
fade out since the nominal rate of return on foreign capital is much higher than the 
nominal rate of interest on foreign debt. As it turns out, in the long run the net foreign 
borrowing in fact increases and, as a result, the initial reduction on foreign debt is 
mostly offset within 25 years. The major benefit of the sale of public-sector enterprises 
is realised in terms of a significant reduction in net domestic borrowing and domestic 
debt that occurs due to a sizeable reduction in the primary fiscal deficit and its 
subsequent effects on the interest payments on domestic debt. 
In case complete crowding out occurs (Table 6), net foreign borrowing and 
foreign debt are not affected where as net domestic borrowing and domestic debt 
decline significantly as before. With complete crowding out the net capital inflow in 
the country remains unaffected and to maintain the given growth rate of GDP, the 
decrease in investment in public sector is fully replaced by the domestic private 
investment. Thus the sale of public assets to foreign investors is practically equivalent 
to the sale to domestic investors. 
The simulation results with partial crowding out and crowding in (or negative 
crowding out), presented in Table 7 and Table 8 respectively, do not show any 
fundamental difference from the previous two cases. It appears, therefore, that the usual 
argument in favour of selling public assets to foreign investors is not empiricallyTable 5 
Foreign and Domestic Borrowing and Debt (∆λ = –0.05, γ = 0) 
  Year  FBi DBi FDi DDi  FB/Y(%)  DB/Y(%)  FD/Y(%)  DD/Y(%) 
1995-96      32      58      769      842  1.49  2.72  35.79  39.20 
1999-00      70      81    1290    1123  1.85  2.14  34.12  29.70 
2003-04    138    136    2237    1571  2.07  2.05  33.64  23.62 
2007-08    274    265    3998    2406  2.34  2.27  34.16  20.56 
2011-12    563    559    7374    4128  2.73  2.71  35.82  20.05 
2015-16  1203  1207  14115    7828  3.32  3.33  38.97  21.61 
2019-20 2670  2600  28156  15816  4.19  4.08  44.18  24.82 
CGR  20.23  17.14    16.19    13.00  4.40  1.71    0.88  –1.89 
 Table 6 
Foreign and Domestic Borrowing and Debt (∆λ = –0.05, γ = 1) 
   Year  FBi DBi FDi DDi  FB/Y(%)  DB/Y(%)  FD/Y(%)  DD/Y(%) 
1995-96      51      39      788      823  2.39  1.82  36.68  38.31 
1999-00      87      57    1393    1020  2.30  1.52  36.84  26.98 
2003-04    154    105    2452    1355  2.31  1.58  36.87  20.37 
2007-08    287    227    4355    2046  2.45  1.94  37.22  17.48 
2011-12    565    517    7894    3601  2.75  2.51  38.34  17.49 
2015-16  1182  1176  14777    7152  3.26  3.25  40.80  19.75 
2019-20 2595  2617  28828  15117  4.07  4.11  45.24  23.72 
CGR  17.77  19.13    16.18    12.89  2.25  3.44    0.88  –1.98 
 Table 7 
Foreign and Domestic Borrowing and Debt (∆λ = –0.5, γ = 0.5) 
  Year  FBi DBi FDi  DDi  FB/Y(%)  DB/Y(%)  FD/Y(%)  DD/Y(%) 
1995-96      42      49      779      833  1.94  2.27  36.24  38.76 
1999-00      79      69    1341    1071  2.08  1.83  35.48  28.34 
2003-04    146    121    2345    1463  2.19  1.82  35.25  22.00 
2007-08    280    246    4176    2226  2.40  2.10  35.69  19.03 
2011-12    565    537    7635    3864  2.74  2.61  37.09  18.77 
2015-16  1194  1190  14452    7484  3.30  3.28  39.90  20.66 
2019-20 2637  2604  28512  15446  4.14  4.09  44.74  24.24 
CGR  18.87  18.03    16.19    12.94  3.21  2.48    0.88  –1.94 
 Table 8 
Foreign and Domestic Borrowing and Debt (∆λ = –0.5, γ = –0.5) 
  Year  FBi DBi  FDi  DDi  FB/Y(%)  DB/Y(%)  FD/Y(%) DD/Y(%) 
1995-96      22      68      759      852  1.05  3.16  35.34  39.65 
1999-00      62      92    1239    1174  1.63  2.44  32.77  31.06 
2003-04    130    152    2131    1678  1.95  2.28  32.04  25.23 
2007-08    267    285    3820    2585  2.28  2.44  32.65  22.09 
2011-12    560    581    7113    4393  2.72  2.82  34.55  21.34 
2015-16  1210  1228  13771    8180  3.34  3.39  38.02  22.58 
2019-20 2698  2605  27769  16216  4.23  4.09  43.58  25.45 
CGR  22.08  16.41    16.18    13.06  6.00  1.08    0.88  –1.83 
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supported in our model. The only benefit of this policy is a reduction in the primary 
fiscal deficit and the resulting decrease in domestic borrowing and domestic debt. This 
benefit can, however, be realised by selling public assets to domestic investors as well. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
The effects of two different policies to attract foreign investment on the 
foreign and domestic borrowings and debt are discussed within the framework of a 
three-gap simulation model applied to the economy of Pakistan. The policy of 
increasing the rate of return on foreign capital can reduce foreign debt only when 
foreign capital is sufficiently responsive to its rate of return. The improvement in 
foreign debt is, however, accompanied by a deteriorating position of domestic debt. 
The policy of selling public assets abroad to attract foreign capital is disappointingly 
fruitless. The benefit of this policy occurs mainly in terms of reduced primary fiscal 
deficit and the resulting decrease in domestic debt. This result can better be achieved 
by selling public assets domestically. Thus we conclude that the usual argument that 
the burden of foreign debt can be reduce by selling public-sector enterprises to 
foreign investors does not hold much ground. 
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First of all, I congratulate Dr Eatzaz Ahmad for this good paper that is well 
written and focused on an important issue of national  concern; that is,  the evaluation 
of the impact of various policies of resource mobilisation on debt reduction. The author 
has rightly stated that sustainable solution to the  problem of resource constraints faced 
by Pakistan today is to raise the overall savings  rate by increasing the national income  
through productivity growth; but the policy-makers have  resorted to policies of short-
term relief like debt roll-over to deffer the bite of the resource constraints. He explores 
the effects of two different policies to attract foreign investment on foreign borrowing 
and debt.  The policies that are considered are: 
  (i) increasing the return on foreign capital; and 
  (ii) selling public sector enterprises exclusively to  foreign investors. 
This impact is analysed in the context of a three gap general equilibrium 
growth model. The innovation in analysis being that the increase in foreign 
investment is used in reducing foreign debt rather than increasing the growth rate of 
GDP through investment. Given the general equilibrium specification of the model 
and the level of aggregation (or low level of disaggregation) involved  in it the 
conclusions are correct for the two hypothetical policies that are analysed here. It 
should be known that the use of general equilibrium analysis is a tricky business for 
policy-making because we are dealing with identities where a reduction in the value 
of one variable automatically implies  an increase in the value of the other; the 
behavioural factors loose their importance unless explicitly incorporated in the 
model. 
In the following I will comment on the policy relevance of this analysis 
followed by some technical issues: In the present model, for example, a policy of 
disinvestment of public enterprise by privatisation leads to reduction in Igi in 
Equation (6), that leads to reduction in budget deficit. The proceeds from this 
privatisation when used to retire foreign debt (FD) results in reduced foreign 
borrowing (FB) and domestic borrowing (DB) etc. But in case of Pakistan’s 
implementation of privatisation programme, the privatisation proceeds are not 
entirely used for retiring  foreign debt. Rather, these proceeds were used to finance 
large portions of current expenditures of the government as well as to finance social 
sector programmes like SAP. For example, by last year (1995) out of 40 billion 
rupees obtained from privatisation, only Rs 8 billion went to retire foreign debt that 
is only about 20 percent of the privatisation proceeds. In terms of the equations of 
this model it means that in Equation (6) as public investment (Igi) is going down due Comments  959 
to privatisation of  state-owned-enterprise public savings are also going down (Sgi) 
due to rechannelling of it in other public expenditures. The consequence is that the 
budget deficit (BDi) does not decline hence no significant reduction in domestic or 
foreign borrowing. The level of aggregation used in the model does not allow for 
capturing of this possibility. Because of this missing aspect the  model looses some 
policy relevance. It would be nice if the author also evaluate the consequences of the 
sale-to-consume and sale-to-invest policies on growth rates of domestic and foreign 
borrowing through their effect on output. 
There is another way in which the reader is puzzled by the policy relevance of 
this analysis—the two policies analysed are hypothetical. Neither Pakistan has 
increased the real rate of return to foreigners ρ, nor it is selling  public assets 
exclusively to foreigners. 
How to increase real returns on foreign investment so as to attract foreign 
capital is itself a complex issue given the fact that political uncertainty is a big 
deterent to foreign capital inflow and that it is not a policy instrument that can be 
changed easily by discretionary control . 
In the end Dr Eatzaz concludes that the “results can better be achieved by  
selling public assets domestically”. But selling assets exclusively to domestic 
investors has its own problems. 
  1. Liquidity shortage in domestic economy, i.e., the domestic investors cannot 
afford to buy. 
  2. Domestic investors may not have incentives to purchase the assets offered 
for sale. 
  3. Domestic producers may not be very efficient as compared to foreign 
managers. 
Transferring management from one group of inefficient managers 
(government) to the other inefficient group (domestic private sector) is not the 
objective of privatisation. Due to externalities associated with technology spill-
overs, experience etc. foreign managers may be able to achieve results not possible 
by domestic managers. 
As far as I understand the present privatisation policy does not offer public 
assets for sale exclusively to foreigners. For example one can see privatisation of 
giants projects like PTC. 
In the end let me come to a technical comment, i.e., the simulation technique 
used in this analysis is not specified. As long as the dynamic linkages between 
various variables and their growth rates are linear a simple simulation method will 
give correct results. But in non-linear systems there can be more than one critical 
values of β. In that case we have to check β over the entire range of possible β or we Syed Salman Ali  960 
have to utilise some random search method with random perturbations. I also found 
some typographical mistakes that I will hand over to the author for correction in the 
final version. 
To end this discussion I would say that the contribution of this paper is indeed 
a new thrust to the application of three gap model to Pakistan and its focus on the 
evaluation of debt reduction policies. 
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